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THE POWER TO COMPEL PHYSICAL EXAMINA-
TION IN CASES OF INJURY TO PERSON. 
The modern trial is the outgrowth of years of development of 
the law of procedure. Formerly it seemed as if a court was an 
arena wherein a combatant was allowed to use almost any artifice 
to deceive his opponent and the judge. Indeed, so evil were the 
effects of this policy, that aid was sought from equity to correct 
them. Hence arose '' bills of discovery," issued for the purpose 
of obtaining from an antagonist, testimony, the production of 
which, courts of law could not compel. More recently, however, 
it has become recognized that the object of a trial is to enforce 
exact justice between man and man, and to the establishing of this 
justice all minor considerations must yield. The equitable bill of 
discovery has been superseded in most of our States by statutes 
compelling a party to a suit to produce for his opponent whatever 
documents or like evidence he possesses which may be essential to 
the prosecution or defense of his opponent's case. 
In the constantly increasing number of accident cases against 
railroads and like corporations it is frequently of importance and 
always of value to obtain if possible medical examination of the 
plaintiff previous to trial. This procedure is instituted by a motion 
resembling the motions for disclosure of evidence above men-
tioned. 
It is to be observ.ed at the outset that such motions should be 
granted only when the information sought is necessary for the 
support of the defendant's case, never where the object is solely 
to obtain evidence adverse to the plaintiff. The former is a legiti-
mate exercise of a right calculated to promote exact justice, the 
latter is but an attempt to compel the adverse party to " give 
away " his case and should be open to the suspicion that the party 
making it intends to manufacture evidence sufficient to meet all 
exigencies. In equity bills of discovery of this nature are termed 
" fishing bills. " 
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Such motions should always be made in writing previous to 
trial, and after demand upon the plaintiff and refusal by him to 
submit to the examination. This will avoid any interruption dur-
ing the trial and will also prevent the plaintiff pleading surprise 
when the motion is made to the court. The motion should allege 
(r) that such examination is necessary in order to aid defendant in 
making its defense ; ( 2) that plainti~ has been requested to 
submit to an examination by some reputable physician or surgeon 
and has refused ; (3) that plaintiff has not been theretofore 
examined or if he has been, defendant is wholly ignorant of the 
results of the same (S.C. & P.R. Co. v. Finlayson, x6 Neb. 578 ; a 
I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Underwood, 64 Tex. 463). b This is the usual 
form of motion before courts which are willing to order such 
examinations, but upon the abstract power of a trial court to 
grant such motions and make an order for an examination the 
decisions of our States are at variance and are not altogether 
reconcilable. Indeed this form of procedure is .peculiar to the 
United States and dates back no further than r868. In that year 
.at Special Term in New York (Walsh v. Sayres, 52 How. Pr. 334), 
the judge asserted his power to compel the plaintiff in an action 
for malpractice to submit to an examination before trial and 
granted a motion to that effect. In Harrold v. N.Y. & C. R. Co., 
21 Hun. 268, decided in May term, r88o, it was held that under 
the Code the Court could not refuse to grant an order for an exam-
ination upon proper application before trial, and in Shaw v. Van 
Rensselaer, 6o How. Pr. 143. decided in the following December 
term, the same result was reached in an opinion affirming the two 
preceding cases; see also Osborn v. M. R. Co., 5 N.Y. Law Bulle-
tin 8. On the other hand in 188 3, the General Term in the case of 
Roberts v. 0. & L. C. R. Co., 29 Hun. 154, overruled all the pre-
ceding decisions, and denied that courts had any power to make 
such an order. The Superior Court in the case of Neuman v. 
Third Ave. R. Co., so N. Y. Sup. J. & S. 412, decided in June, 
~884, followed the General Term in denying such a motion. 
The issue has never come squarely before the Court of 
Appeals, though in a dissenting opinion in Elfers v. Wooley, II6 
N. Y. 294, decided in October, r889, Judge Potter cites the Rob-
erts and Neuman cases with approval and impliedly denies the 
power. 
aS. C., 49 Am. Rep. 724; 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 68. 
b S. C., 27 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 240. 
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Missouri was the next State to decide this question. In Lloyd 
v. H. & St. J. R. Co., 53 Mo. 509, c decided in 1873, the court 
declared such a motion to be '' unknown to our practice and to 
the law," and that it would have no power to enforce such an 
order. But in 1885 the Schroeder case, cited below, had been 
decided and a different conclusion was reached in Shepard v. 
M. P. R. Co., 85 Mo. 629, d decided in that year. Referring to 
the Lloyd case, the court said : 
"We are not prepared to say, that in no case can such an order be made. 
Certainly if the court can make the order it will have no difficulty in enforcing 
it, not that it can compel the party to submit to a personal examination, but it 
may dismiss a plaintiff's suit for a persistent 1efusal to do so." 
The court proceeds to hold that a judge may in his discretion 
order an examination, though a defendant has no absolute right 
to such order, and that the discretion of the judge will not be inter-
fered with unless manifestly abused. The same court two years 
afterward approved of the decision in the Shepard case in Sidekum 
v. W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 93 Mo. 4oo, e and finally in x888 came 
out squarely in asserting such power in Owens v. K. C. St. J. & C. 
B. Ry C.o., 95 Mo. 169,/ saying: 
" The power of the court to make and enforce an order for the personal 
examination of the injured party must be taken as established in this State as 
it is in many others." 
It is true that in none of the Missouri cases was the motion actu-
ally granted, but the failures were merely because of faults in 
procedure,-the power to grant was distinctly asserted. Missouri, 
however, was by no means the originator of this doctrine; that 
distinction belongs to Iowa. In 1877, two years after the Lloyd 
case, the Supreme Court of Iowa took opposite grounds in Schroe-
derv. C. R.I. & P.R. Co., 47Iowa375,gacaseconsideredwith 
such profundity and breadth that it ha.S remained the leader of 
its doctrine ever since, and, it may well be imagined, has been 
instrumental in shaping the subsequent decisions of other courts. 
It is interesting to see how the opinion in this case illustrates the 
adaptability of the common law. It would be difficult to find a 
more typical instance of the "judicial legislation," which Judge 
c S. C., 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 474· 
d S. C., 55 Am. Rep. 390. 
e S. C., 3 Am. St. Rep. 549; 30 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 640, 
f S. C., 6 Am. St. Rep. 139; 33 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 524-
g S. C., 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 359· 
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Cooley so highly commends. 
Beck, J., said : 
In the course of his opinion, 
" To our minds the proposition is plain that a proper examination by 
learned and skillful physicians and surgeons would have opened a road by 
which the cause could have been conducted nearer to exact justice than in any 
other way. The plaintiff, as it were, had under his control testimony which 
would have revealed the truth more clearly than any other that could have 
been introduced. The cause of truth, the right administration of the law. 
demand that he should have produced it." 
In reply to the argument that the court was clothed with no 
power to enforce obedience to such an order in case of the 
plaintiff's refusal to obey, the opinion proceeds very tersely. 
" His refusal would have been an impediment to the administration of 
justice and a contempt of the court's authority. He would have been subject 
to punishment as a recusant witness who refused to answer proper questions 
propounded to him. Should such recusancy too long delay the court, or prove 
an effective obstruction to the progress of the case, the court could have 
stricken from the pleadings all the allegations as to permanent injury, and 
withdrawn from the jury that part of the case. * * * When it is 
remembered that plaintiff was a witness before the court, that the examination 
of his person would have had the effect to elicit testimony from him as upon a 
cross examinatioiJ., the power of the court over him will be readily understood." 
The precedent once having been established by this case, it 
was not long before other States followed. 
In Miami, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Bailey, 37 Ohio St. 104, decided 
in I88I, the court approved the Schroeder case so far as to say 
that on the refusal of the plaintiff to comply with such order when 
properly made, the court may dismiss the action or refuse to allow 
the plaintiff to give evidence to establish the injury and that this 
authority of the court was based upon its inherent power over the 
subject under investigation. But the Ohio court gives more dis-
cretion to the trial judge, holding that in the absence of any 
showing to the contrary, upon the refusal of a judge to grant such 
application, it will be presumed that the order ought not to have 
been granted. In A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Thul, 29 Kan. 466, h 
decided in January, 1883, the court held to the opinion in the 
Schroeder case and rejected the Missouri doctrine laid down in the 
Lloyd case, saying : 
" It would seem that in a case like the present the evidence of some such 
expert who had made such an examination would be an almost indispensable 
necessity ; but such evidence in many cases could not be obtained unless the 
plaintiff were first compelled by an order of the court to submit himself to a 
h S. C., 44 Am. Rep. 659; Io Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 783. 
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personal examination by some such expert. Now is such evidence to be lost 
and justice possibly defeated, or may the court order that such an examination 
may be had? \Ve favor the proposition contained in the latter portion of this 
alternative. \Ve should think that the defendant in a case like the present 
would be entitled as a matter of right, upon a proper application and a proper 
showing to have an order made by the court compelling the plaintiff to submit 
himself to a personal examination, for the purpose of ascertaining the nature, 
character, extent and permanency of his injuries ; but of course the court 
should exercise a sound judicial discretion in making such an order." 
This " sound judicial discretion," means that the trial judge 
may limit the introduction. of such testimony to the necessities of 
the case. For instance, if such an examination had already been 
made by experts of reputation and character, further evidence on 
this point might be only cumulative and tend to delay the case. 
In such event the judge would be justified in refusing to grant 
such an order. But the Kansas doctrines gives to the defendant as 
a matter of right the privilege of having an examination made at 
some stage of the proceedings. 
In S. C. & P. R. Co. v. Finlayson, x6 Neb. 578, decided in 
July, 1884, the court inclined to the belief that the trial court had 
the power to make and enforce an order for examination, but 
held that he did right in refusing to make such an order 
because, 
• • There was no snowing made to the court that permission to make the 
examination had been refused by defendant in error, nor that any such per-
mission had been requested. There is no showing of any kind that such exam-
ination was necessary in order to aid plaintiff in error in making its defense, 
indeed there was no intimation that any good could possibly result or benefit 
be derived from such an examination." 
In Stuart v. Havens, 17 Neb. 211, decided six months after the 
Finlayson case, the court approved the doctrine there laid down, 
commenting at length upon what was only mentioned in the for-
mer decision, namely, that the examination was sought to be made 
by experts called by the adverse party, and saying, 
"Where in a case like this experts are called by a party and permitted to 
make a personal examination of the person injured and to testify therefrom 
there is danger that they will feel under obligations to the party calling them, 
and, however honest they may be, color their testimony somewhat in his 
interest, while in many if not most cases their general views will be known to 
the party producing them before they are called. In any event the evidence 
partakes somewhat of a partisan character. To avoid this they should be 
agreed upon by the parties or appointed by the court, and an examination if 
desired, should be made before the trial begins, although the court may permit 
it to be made during the progress of the trial." 
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In White v. M. R. Co., 61 Wis. 536, i decided in r884, the court 
cited the Schroeder case with approval and while expressing no 
opinion as to whether it was discretionary with the trial court to 
grant or deny the motion, reversed the ruling of said court 
because he had denied the application on the sole ground that 
he had no authority to compel the plaintiff to s:ubmit to an exam-
ination against her will. 
Hatfield v. St. P. & D. R. Co., 33 Minn. 13o,/decided in Janu-
ary, r885, is the only Minnesota case touching on this point. 
There the court, citing the Schroeder and Thul cases, said: 
"From analogy to such cases, we conclude that a court has thepower, in a 
proper case and under proper circumstances, to direct the plaintiff to do a 
physical act in the presence of the jury that will illustrate or show the character 
of his injuties. And we are by no means prepared to say that there may not 
be circumstances where the defendant would have a right to such an order. 
But it is evident from the very nature of things that the propriety of such an 
order must usually rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and it would 
only be in a case of a plain abuse of such discretion that we would interfere." 
In I. G. & N. Ry. Co. v. Underwood, 64 Tex. 463, decided in 
z885, the motion contained a request that the court appoint 
three disinterested surgeons and physicians to examine the person 
of the plaintiff. The motion was denied because it did not allege 
that such an examination was necessary to the full presentation of 
all the facts, nor that the plaintiff was unwilling to be examined 
by any reputable physician or surgeon. And it further appeared 
that the plaintiff had submitted to such an examination by experts 
whom the defendant had called as witnesses. Nevertheless the 
court seems to uphold the power of the trial court as laid down in 
the Schroeder case. 
M. P. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 95, k decided in r888, 
affirms I. G. & N. Ry. Co. v. Underwood sup., but held it no error 
that the court refused to " compel plaintiff to be examined by the 
one physician to whom he expressed an objection, although this 
objection did not go to the competency or integrity of the phy-
sician proposed. If this power should be exercised at all, it should 
be by the appointment by the court of one or more disinterested 
experts, either of its own selection or such as may be agreed upon 
by both parties." 
iS. C., so Am. Rep. 154; rB Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 213. 
j S. C., 53 Am. Rep. 14; xB Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 292. 
k S. C., 37 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 127, 
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In G. C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Norfleet, 78 Tex. 321, l 189o, 
the court refused to make the order because the plaintiff sub-
mitted the injured member for examination. " In no case should 
such an order be made, when the party is willing to be examined 
by competent and disinterested men without such an order." 
From the Texas decisions it may reasonably be inferred that 
upon a proper motion the court would order such an examination 
by physicians which it should appoint. They certainly impliedly 
hold that it has the power to make such order. 
Sibley, Receiver, v. Smith, 46 Ark. 275, nz decided in Novem-
ber, 1885, lays clown the following rule: 
"Where the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries alleges that they are 
of a permanent nature, the defendant is entitled, as a matter of right, to have 
the opinion of a surgeon upon his condition- an opinion based upon personal 
examination. In refusing to order the examination as it may do when the 
evidence of experts is already abundant, the circuit court must exercise a sound 
discretion; and its action is subject to review in case of abuse." 
R. & D. R. Co. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719, n decided in March, 
1889, asserts that the court in its discretion has power to order a 
compulsory personal examination by physicians appointed by it 
and paid by the party making the motion. 
A. G. S. R. Co. v. Hill (Ala.) 44 A. & E. R. R. Cas., 443, o 
decided June, 189o, is in line with the other decisions in favor of 
granting the motion. And here the court goes further than in 
most of the other cases, holding not only a manifest abuse of dis-
cretion in denying a motion to he error, but ''if a proper case for 
granting the motion is clearly made, and is refused, the appellate 
court, having before it all the facts involved in the determination 
of the matter in the lower court, will reverse the judgment thus 
infected with error." This case again came up on the point as to 
the appointment of experts in 9 South. Rep. 722. 
Indiana asserts the power to compel an examination in the two 
cases of Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225,} decided in November, 189o, 
and T. H. & I. R. Co. v. Brunker, 26 N. E. Rep. 178, decided in 
December, 1890. 
Illinois in 1882, in the case of Parker. v. Enslow, 102 Ill. 272, If 
decided in a short, and ill-considered opinion that '' The court had 
IS. C., 45 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 207. 
m S. C., 55 Am. Rep. 584. 
n S.C., 14 Am. St. Rep. 18g; 51 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 216. 
o S.C., 44 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 441. 
p S.C., 17Am-St. Rep. 355; 23 N. E. Rep. 156. 
q S.C., 40 Am. Rep. 588. 
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no power to make or enforce such an order." But in C. 
& E. I. R. Co. z•. Holland, 122 Ill. 461, r decided in 1887, the court 
makes no mention of Parker v. Enslow, and expressly refuses to 
pass upon the question there decided, holding that the defendant 
was not injured by the refusal of the trial court to grant the 
motion, inasmuch as it was allowed by the plaintiff to make an 
examination which was all that was asked for by the motion. 
It is thus seen that the courts of last resort in all of the States 
before mentioned but Illinois have expressly or impliedly held that 
a trial judge has the power to compel a plaintiff to submit to a 
physical examination. It is therefore a matter of some surprise 
to find that the Federal Supreme Court directly opposes this doc-
trine. In the case of U. P. R. Co. v. Botsford, I I Sup. Ct. Rep. 
Iooo, s decided last May, Mr. Justice Gray delivers the opinion 
which holds that the courts of the United States have no legal 
right to make or enforce such an order. The decision is based 
upon the inviolability of the person which the court says is as much 
invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. 
The cases in the inferior courts of New York, and the cases of 
Lloyd v. R. R. and Parker v. Enslow, all mentioned above, are 
cited in support of the decision. But it has been seen that the New 
York cases are conflicting and indecisive, the Lloyd case was over-
ruled by the Owens case, and Parker v. Enslow was at least doubted 
in the Holland case. It is significant therefore that there should 
be a dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice Brewer delivers it and it is 
concurred in by Mr. Justice Brown. While not presuming to criti-
cise the opinion of this greatest of tribunals, yet a comparison 
with the dissenting opinion must leave in the mind at least a 
doubt as to soundness of the decision reached. The former pro-
ceeds upon the ground of common law traditions and the lack of 
precedent ; four cases are cited, two of inferior courts, one over-
ruled and one weakened by a subsequent decision. The latter 
ignores the lack of precedent, and supported by the decisions of 
every State but one which has decided the question, says : 
" The silence of the common law authorities proves little or nothing. The 
number of actions to recover ·damages in early days was, compared with the 
later times limited ; and very few of those difficult questions, as to the nature 
and extent of the injuries, which now form an important part of such litiga-
tions, were then presented to the courts. * * ,. The end of litiga-
tion is justice. Knowledge of the truth is essential thereto. * * * 
It seems strange that a plaintiff may, in the presence of a jury, be permitted to 
r S. C., 13 N. E. Rep. 145; 30 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 590· 
s S. C., 44 Alb. L. J. 325; 33 Cent. L. J. 363; 16 R. R. & C. L. J. 306. 
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roll up his sleeves and disclose on his ann a wound of which he testifies ; but, 
when he testifies as to the existence of such a wound, the court, though per-
suaded that he is perjuring himself, cannot require him to roll up his sleeve, 
and thus make manifest the truth, nor require him, in the like interest of truth, 
to step into an adjoining room, and lay bare his ann to the inspection of sur-
geons. It is said that there is a sanctity of the person which may not be out-
raged. We believe that truth and justice are more sacred than any personal 
consideration ; and if in other cases, in the interests of justice, or from consid-
erations of mercy, the courts may, as they often do, require such personal 
examination, why should they not exercise the same power in cases like this, to 
prevent wrong and injustice?" 
With the exception of this decision the following may be taken to 
be the present doctrine of this country. Trial courts have the 
power to compel the examination of the person of a plaintiff suing 
for a physical injury. The exercise of this power is in the sound 
discretion of such courts, open, however, to review and correction 
on appeal. The wrongful exercise of this power, or the wrongful 
refusal to exercise it, is error, and may be ground for reversal. 
Edward G. Buckland. 
